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The Proper Scope of Pendent Appellate
Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context
Riyaz A. Kanji
Appellate review of federal district court orders typically requires that the
lower court first enter a final judgment in the proceeding to which those rulings
pertain. The collateral order doctrine, however, allows for the immediate appeal
of a small class of interlocutory determinations.1 Several circuits have held that
this doctrine confers jurisdiction only over those rulings that satisfy its criteria
for expedited review.2 Other circuits, by contrast, have declared that once faced
with an appeal from a collateral determination below, they may freely consider
additional orders rendered by the trial judge, including those potentially disposi-
tive of the underlying litigation.3 The latter circuits generally refer to this
expansion in their interlocutory review as the exercise of pendent appellate
jurisdiction.
This Note contends that the rationale informing the collateral order doctrine
supports only a narrow extension of appellate jurisdiction to pendent issues. Part
I discusses the final judgment rule and the development of statutory and judicial
responses-including collateral order review-to the hardships and inefficiencies
the rule can produce. Part II delineates the different approaches adopted by the
circuits to the consideration of rulings pendent to an appropriately appealed
collateral determination. Part III argues that while a court's expansion of its
interlocutory jurisdiction to address issues whose resolution appears logically
antecedent to that of a collateral order allows the court properly to fulfill its
function of review, any broader exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction
threatens values central to the effective functioning of our judicial system.
1. The doctrine deems immediately reviewable those rulings unrelated to the merits of an action and
implicating rights that cannot be vindicated after the entry of judgment. Determinations meeting its
requirements include those holding a government official's absolute or qualified immunity from suit, or a
criminal defendant's right not to be tried twice for the same offense as guaranteed by the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution, unavailable in a given case. The doctrine is explained in detail, infra notes 20-43
and accompanying text.
2. The First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted this approach, and the D.C. Circuit appears
to favor it. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
3. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits adhere to this position. See infra notes 58-64
and accompanying text.
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I. FINALITY AS A PREREQUISITE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. The Final Judgment Rule
Congress has long structured the federal judicial system to allow for appeals
in almost all cases only from the final judgment of a lower court The Su-
preme Court has construed this requirement strictly, repeatedly identifying a
district court decision that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment"5 as a necessary predicate to
appellate review. The final judgment rule guards, the Court has asserted, against
the repeated interruption of district court proceedings, making possible the
orderly and effective conduct of a trial and the full development of a record
for subsequent review.' It prevents the burdening of the appeals courts with
the immediate consideration of determinations which might later be rendered
moot, either because the party who lost the ruling prevails on the merits or
because the issue fails to affect the final judgment in a manner warranting
reversal.7 And it reduces the ability of parties to "clog the courts through a
succession of costly and time-consuming appeals" 8 which could drain their
opponents' desire and capacity to pursue meritorious claims.
The final judgment rule also serves to maintain the appropriate relationship
between the district and appellate courts. It preserves the respect due trial
judges as the initial adjudicators of the numerous legal and factual issues that
arise during a case by ensuring that their every determination is not subject to
the immediate review of an appellate tribunal one step removed from the
litigation. The constant specter of such review would reduce the district judge
to a token figure. If her rulings could be challenged instantly and as often as
the parties desired, they would serve simply as provisional orders having little
independent impact on the ongoing conduct of a case.9 The consolidation of
all contested rulings into a single appeal provides the circuit courts with an
opportunity, furthermore, to consider a trial judge's actions in light of the entire
4. DiBellav. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962). Congress, acting pursuant to its Article Il power
to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, incorporated the finality requirement into the first Judiciary
Act. See 1 Stat. 73, 83-85 (1789) (providing for appeals only from "final judgments or decrees"). The
requirement remains codified at section 1291 of the current Judicial Code, which vests the courts of appeals
with "jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
5. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation omitted); see also Lauro Lines S.R.L.
v. Chasser, 109 S. Ct. 1976, 1978 (1989) (quoting Catlin); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,521-
22 (1988) (quoting Catlin); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (noting consistent judicial
implementation of congressional policy against piecemeal review). I
6. See Richardson-Merrel, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Rlsjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940).
7. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
8. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984).
9. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374 ("Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the
independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system.").
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proceedings below, thereby enhancing the likelihood of sound appellate review
of the various issues involved in a litigation. 10
The final judgment rule is not without serious shortcomings, however. In
those situations in which a trial occurs shortly after the institution of proceed-
ings and the trial itself is brief and uncomplicated, there appear to be few
negative consequences in allowing a case to advance to its conclusion without
the opportunity for interlocutory appeal. But liberal joinder and discovery
provisions, the rise of the class action suit, the proliferation of pretrial motions,
and a host of other factors have rendered contemporary litigation increasingly
lengthy and complex. This development has led to a recognition of the costs
attendant upon a rigid adherence to the finality requirement.
Commentators have focused on two failings of the final judgment rule in
particular. First, mistaken trial court rulings "may often have serious and
continuous effects which cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment
long in the future."'" The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, a discov-
ery ruling that forces the release of confidential information, or a determination
that a suit may or may not be maintained as a class action are all examples of
district court orders which can modify a party's rights swiftly and irremediably.
The promptness with which any corrective action is taken in these situations
can prove crucial to a reviewing court's success in assuring justice to the
litigants. 2 Even where the delay of appellate review does not threaten parties
with the effective loss of significant rights, it can result in wasted expenditures
of effort by both the litigants and the courts. An error in the district court may
so taint subsequent events as to require reversal and a new trial. Alternatively,
the court may erroneously deny a motion that would obviate the need for a trial
altogether. Failure to review an order issued early in a case until after final
judgment can thus lead to the exertion of "substantial physical, financial and
emotional effort in the preparation and conduct of a trial which may later prove
to [be] worthless.' 3
B. Statutory Exceptions
Recognition of the shortcomings inherent in a rigid application of the final
judgment rule has led to the promulgation of exceptions by both Congress and
the courts. The most frequently invoked statutory qualification is section
1292(a) of the Judicial Code, which provides the circuit courts with jurisdiction
over appeals from, inter alia, "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district
10. See DiBela v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962).
11. R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 79 (2d ed. 1989).
12. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil interlocutory Appeals Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1984, at 165.
13. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89,
98 (1975).
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courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-
tions."14 This provision reflects congressional awareness that trial court rulings
regarding injunctive relief can be of "'serious, perhaps irreparable, conse-
quence"' 15 to a litigant and therefore merit immediate review.
Section 1292(b) provides that where a district judge certifies that an order
"involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion," and further finds "that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,"'6
an appellate court may consider the ruling on an interlocutory basis. A third
exception to the final judgment rule is found in rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which allows for immediate appeal upon certification by
a district judge of orders conclusive with respect to specific parties or claims
in a litigation. Its importance heightened by the liberal joinder provisions
governing in the federal courts, 17 the rule serves to protect a litigant whose
rights are adjudicated early in a multifaceted case but who, absent the excep-
tion, would have to wait for final judgment in the entire action before seeking
an appeal.
C. The Collateral Order Doctrine
The provisions discussed above fall far short of covering the variety of
situations in which a rigid adherence to the final judgment rule might produce
serious inefficiency or injustice. Section 1292(a) applies only to injunctive
relief, while section 1292(b) and rule 54(b) are limited to civil actions involving
complex issues or parties and contain restrictive certification procedures." The
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1988).
15. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978) (quoting Baltimore
Contractos, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
17. See FED. R. CiV. P. 19, 20.
18. Requiring trial court certification prior to section 1292(b) review has provoked increasing criticism.
Congress structured section 1292(b) so as to protect the circuit courts from a flood of ill-founded appeals.
Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REv. 607, 624
(1975). By giving the trial judge complete discretion as to the immediate reviewability of her own
determinations, however, Congress vested absolute authority in the individual least likely to perceive the
need or desire for such review. As a result, the opportunity for appellate correction of erroneous orders has
been minimal, leading Professors James and Hazard to advocate "a procedure in which trial judges can
indicate whether they believe interlocutory appeal would be appropriate with regard to particular orders,
but in which their adverse views in this respect would not foreclose the appellate court from granting
review." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §12.12, at 673 (3d ed. 1985).
The inadequacies which many commentators perceive in the current federal appellate scheme generally
have led to numerous calls for a legislative modification of the finality requirement. See, e.g., STERN, supra
note 11, at 87; Redish, supra note 13; Note, Toward a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A Proposal
to Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEO. L.J 1025 (1979). Several state jurisdictions have, indeed, moved
significantly away from the final judgment rule. New York, for example, permits appeal as of right from
any order which "involves some part of the merits" or "affects a substantial right." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &
R. § 5701(a) (McKinney 1978). In California, the courts have increasingly used the extraordinary writs to
review a broad spectrum of rulings prior to final judgment. Christian, Interlocutory Review in Califor-
nia-Practical Justice Unguided by Standards, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 111. See also
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courts have responded by formulating exceptions of their own to the final judg-
ment rule, the most important of which is the collateral order doctrine. 19
1. Origins
The Court established the collateral order doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp."2 by declaring immediately appealable those rulings that
"finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated."21 Cohen was a shareholder's derivative suit in
which the question arose, prior to trial, whether a New Jersey statute applied
in federal court. The statute rendered an unsuccessful plaintiff liable for the
defendant's litigation costs and required the plaintiff to post security for those
costs in anticipation of the proceedings.' The district court declined to de-
mand such security from the shareholder. Immediate review was sought in the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed the ruling below. The
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the existence of appellate jurisdiction
over the pretrial order, identifying three factors central to its determination.
First, the district court's ruling denying application of the state statute was in
no way "tentative, informal or incomplete."'  The court had conclusively
rejected the corporation's request that security be posted and had ordered the
trial to commence. Second, this decision was wholly unrelated to the merits of
the action and would not, as a result, be affected by further proceedings in the
case.24 Third, the lower court order was too important to be denied immediate
review, for the asserted right of the corporation to have its litigation costs
secured prior to the onset of trial would be "lost, probably irreparably,"by the
time of final judgment. z5
STERN, supra note 11, at 86-88, 97-98 (describing review of interlocutory orders in Georgia, Maine,
Massachusetts, Arizona, and others).
19. The Supreme Court sanctioned the first of the judicial departures from the finality requirement well
over a century ago. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848), involved a decree setting aside an
assignment of property and directing its immediate delivery to the plaintiff, a trustee in bankruptcy. The
decree did not represent a final judgment, for the district court had also ordered an accounting of rents and
profits which had yet to be completed. It threatened the defendant assignees with irreparable injury, however,
as the trustee planned to dispose of the property and to distribute the proceeds quickly for the benefit of
creditors. Recognizing this threat, the Court created an exception to the final judgment requirement which,
although never expanded beyond cases involving the imminent disposition of property, survives to this day.
20. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
21. Id. at 546.
22. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court rested on the diverse citizenship of the parties.
Id. at 543.
23. Id. at 546.
24. Id. ('Tihis order of the District Court did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits
of the case and will not be merged in final judgment.').
25. Id.
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
2. Evolution: Scrutinizing the Need for Immediate Review
The Cohen Court asserted that it was not forging an exception to sec-
tion 1291, but rather was supplying a reasonable construction of the statutory
requirement that there exist a final decision prior to appeal.'s Despite this
claim, it is difficult to interpret the Court's decision as other than one which
sanctioned immediate review of an interlocutory order.' For, as Professor
Redish has noted, "[i]t is clear that the litigation would have continued.., had
the court of appeals refused to review the trial court's denial of the defendant
corporation's motion."' An examination of the collateral order doctrine's
subsequent development reveals, indeed, that it is best explained as a tailored
reaction to the starkest failings of the finality requirement.
In its early collateral order decisions, the Court did not apply with any
degree of rigor the factors laid out in Cohen for determining appealability.
Instead, the Court interpreted Cohen expansively, focusing on its general
proposition that certain rulings can be reviewed on an interlocutory basis. In
Stack v. Boyle,29 for example, the Court simply cited to Cohen as authority
for declaring an Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim immediately appeal-
able. In a string of more recent cases, however, the Court has limited the reach
of Cohen by placing a greater emphasis on the specific criteria-conclusiveness,
separability from the merits, and the importance of immediate review-articu-
lated in that decision as a basis for appealability. It has paid particularly close
attention to Cohen's third requirement, scrutinizing orders to ascertain the
consequences of delaying their review until final judgment.
Abney v. United States' represents the first of the Court's efforts in this
direction. In holding an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on
double jeopardy grounds immediately appealable, the Court first observed that
the district judge had definitively rejected the defendant's Fifth Amendment
defense.31 It then determined that by its very nature a claim of double jeopardy
is collateral to the main thrust of a criminal trial 2.3 Devoting the bulk of its
attention to the question of whether review of the defendant's claim could await
the final decision of the lower court, the Court concluded that the rights
accorded by the double jeopardy clause could not be vindicated at that stage,
because the very guarantee of the clause is against being tried twice for the
26. Id. Justice Jackson, the author of the Cohen opinion, reiterated the claim several years later. See
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
27. The Court itself has subsequently acknowledged this fact. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463,467-68 (1978) ("[A]n [interlocutory] order is appealable ... only if it comes within an appropriate
exception to the final-judgment rule .... In this case respondents rely on the 'collateral order' exception
articulated by this Court in Cohen ... .
28. Redish, supra note 13, at 94.
29. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
30. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
31. Id. at 659.
32. Id. at 659-60.
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same offense. To force an individual to undergo the strain, humiliation, and
expense of trial before allowing her to take an appeal would be to sap her
asserted constitutional right of all substance. 3
The Court has recognized a right analogous to that identified in Abney in
one other category of cases frequently mentioned by litigants. In Helstoski v.
Meanor,34 the Court held that the privilege granted members of Congress by
the speech and debate clause against having to answer for their legislative
statements in any place other than Congress implicated a right not to be tried
on the basis of those statements similar to that guaranteed by the double
jeopardy clause.35 The Court subsequently has classified immunities enjoyed
by other government officials as protections not merely from liability but from
suit and as thus requiring vindication prior to the commencement of trial.36
In numerous other cases, however, the Court has rejected litigants' asser-
tions as to the need for immediate review of a lower court ruling. On several
occasions, it has done so with respect to claims of immunity from the judicial
process that, while similar to those advanced in the double jeopardy and
government official cases, it has viewed as less important. In Lauro Lines
S.R.L. v. Chasser,37 for example, the Court refused to extend the collateral
order doctrine to claims implicating a right not to be sued or tried in a particu-
lar tribunal as distinguished from a right not to be tried at all, although it recog-
nized that the former could not be "perfectly secured by appeal after final
judgment."38 Similarly, in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,39 the
Court concluded that the protection afforded by the due process clause against
prosecutorial vindictiveness "is simply not one that must be upheld prior to
trial,"'  despite precedent holding that victims of such vindictiveness may
"'not be haled into court at all upon [a resulting] charge."' 41
The Court has also denied immediate appellate consideration of claims as
to which any prospect of post-trial vindication exists, even if those prospects
appear "academic at best."4" In Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Ac-
33. "'The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy
. Id. at 661 (quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970)).
34. 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
35. ld. at 506.
36. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (qualified immunity of cabinet official); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity of president).
37. 109 S. CL 1976 (1989).
38. Id. at 1979. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that "[thle r ason we say that the
[shipowner's] right not to be sued elsewhere than in [Italy] is 'adequately vindicable' by merely reversing
any judgment obtained in violation of it is, quite simply, that the law does not deem the right important
enough to be vindicated by, as it were, an injunction against its violation obtained through interlocutory
appeal. The importance of the right asserted has always been a significant part of our collateral order
doctrine." Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis supplied).
39. 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 270.
41. Id. at 273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)).
42. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 376 (1987).
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tion,43 for example, the Court held that a district court order granting the
respondent CNA permissive intervention subject to various conditions, but
denying it intervention as of right, fell outside the Cohen exception to the final
judgment rule. By virtue of its status as a permissive intervenor, the Court
noted, CNA would be able to raise its objections to the district court's ruling
on appeal from final judgment. The Court did not dispute CNA's contention
that an appellate tribunal would be extremely reluctant to vacate a district court
judgment in a case involving numerous parties and years of litigation because
of an erroneous intervention order. But it stated that where the legal contours
of CNA's asserted right were such that they would not be completely destroyed
absent interlocutory review, it would not grant an exception to the final judg-
ment rule.
The Court has thus limited Cohen's reach to a carefully considered set of
circumstances. Only in cases where section 1291's jurisdictional requirement
would, if mechanically applied, eliminate the role of the appellate courts
altogether with respect to claims deemed essential to litigants, has the Court
countenanced a departure from its rigidities. Where the foreclosure of appellate
review has appeared any less stark, however, the Court has maintained a
stringent adherence to the finality rule.
II. THE DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO THE PROPER SCOPE OF APPELLATE
REVIEW IN THE COLLATERAL ORDER CONTEXT
A. The Supreme Court
In Abney v. United States"4 and its successors, the Supreme Court clearly
delineated the permissible bounds of collateral order jurisdiction. The Court has
not fared as well, however, in attempting to establish the extent to which
appellate tribunals may, in reviewing collateral orders, exercise pendent appel-
late jurisdiction over other rulings in the same case that do not, by themselves,
satisfy the Cohen requirements for expedited review.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"5 the Court appeared to sanction the
extension of collateral order jurisdiction to pendent rulings. After determining
that an order allocating ninety percent of the costs of plaintiff class notification
to the defendants in a securities action fell within the confines of the Cohen
doctrine," the Court asserted that appellate jurisdiction also existed to address
the trial judge's conclusion that individual notice only had to be provided to
a limited number of class members, with notice by publication to the remainder.
The two rulings, the Court reasoned, were related aspects of the district court's
43. Id.
44. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
45. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
46. Id. at 172.
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construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner that allowed
the suit to proceed as a class action despite the representative plaintiff's conten-
tion that he could not bear the costs of notification to all members of the class.
It followed that the appellate tribunal should consider the rulings together in
order to render a fully informed determination as to the propriety of the class
suit, even though the notice-by-publication ruling did not, standing alone, satisfy
the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.47
Three years later, however, the Court took a markedly different approach
to the question of pendent review. After deciding, in Abney, that an appeal
predicated on double jeopardy grounds could be raised immediately, s the
Court declared that the petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of his indict-
ment could not be heard at the same time. Appellate jurisdiction extended only
to those determinations meeting the Cohen criteria. Review of all other claims
would have to await the entry of judgment:
Our conclusion that a defendant may seek immediate appellate review
of a district court's rejection of his double jeopardy claim is based on
the special considerations permeating claims of that nature which justify
a departure from the normal rule of finality. Quite obviously, such
considerations do not extend beyond the claim of former jeopar-
dy .... [Other] claims are appealable if, and only if, they too fall
within Cohen's collateral-order exception to the final-judgment
rule.49
Despite the strong pronouncement contained in Abney, the propriety of
pendent appellate jurisdiction remains an open question. Perhaps Abney's failure
to address the conflicting views expressed in Eisen, or to consider the main
justifications set forth by those circuits that exercise an expanded scope of
collateral order review," is responsible for the persisting debate. But for
whatever reason, the appellate courts continue to evince widely differing
attitudes, as Justice White noted some eight years after Abney,51 toward the
appropriate bounds of their authority when faced with an interlocutory appeal
under Cohen.
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
49. Abney, 431 U.S. at 663. In United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857 n.6 (1978), the Court
reiterated this view, rejecting the Fourth Circuit's argument thatit could hear a defendant's speedy trial claim
as pendent to his double jeopardy appeal.
50. These justifications are set forth in Section Il1.A., infra.
51. San Filippo v. United States Trust Co., 470 U.S. 1035, 1036-37 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari.).
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B. The Circuit Courts
Several circuits have followed the command of the Abney Court that they
enjoy jurisdiction in the collateral order context only to hear those claims that
independently fulfill the Cohen requirements for interlocutory review. In United
States v. Cerilli,52 the Third Circuit refused to consider, pendent to a
defendant's double jeopardy appeal, claims that his indictment was barred by
a statute of limitations and had been tarnished by prosecutorial misconduct. The
latter contentions, the circuit court noted, could be adequately addressed after
final judgment. Under Abney, then, review of these contentions would have to
wait. 3 The First,54 Fourth,5' Ninth,56 and D.C.57 Circuits similarly have
refused to exercise jurisdiction over claims pendent to the collateral orders
properly before them.
A number of other circuits, however, have addressed additional issues when
faced with an appeal satisfying the Cohen requirements. In San Filippo
v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 8 the leading Second Circuit case in
this regard, the court heard and rejected, pursuant to the collateral order doc-
trine, the defendants' absolute immunity appeal. It went on to dismiss the case,
though, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim. In explaining
that it enjoyed jurisdiction to consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
pleadings, the court made reference to neither Eisen nor Abney. It simply stated
52. 558 F.2d 697 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
53. Id. at 699-700; see also Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1209 (3d Cir. 1979) (addressing
only assertion of absolute immunity), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Akerly v. Red Barn System, Inc.,
551 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting review of order denying motion to dismiss complaint on
grounds of attorney misconduct while reviewing order denying disqualification of attorney).
54. See, e.g., Newman v. Massachusetts, 884 F.2d 19,22 (lstCir. 1989) (adhering to "well-established"
First Circuit practice in limiting interlocutory review to issue of qualified immunity), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1131 (1990); Quintana v. Anselmi, 817 F.2d 891, 892 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing to consider
appropriateness of injunctive relief along with qualified immunity appeal); Monge-Vasquez v. Rohena-
Betancourt, 813 F.2d 22, 23 n.1 (Ist Cir. 1987) (same).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Blackwell, 900 F.2d 742, 746-47 (4th Cir. 1990) (declining to review,
in context of double jeopardy appeal, orders denying motions to dismiss indictment on grounds of improper
venue and impermissible forum shopping).
56. See, e.g., Manhattan Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Manhattan Beach, 881 F.2d 816,817-18
(9th Cir. 1989) (scope of review limited to issue of immunity); Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 368
(9th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 829 (1984); United States v. Yellow Freight Sys., 637 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Inquiry into
the immediate appealability of a particular pretrial order must focus upon each claim asserted. Thus
immediate appealability of one of the defendants' claims will not confer pendent appellate jurisdiction over
defendants' other claims.") (citing Abney), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 815 (1981).
57. In Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the circuit criticized without flatly
repudiating the notion that it could append an otherwise nonappealable order to the collateral ruling properly
before it. It held that for the purposes of the instant case it would not review a denial of the defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim along with her absolute immunity appeal. See also Browning
v. Clerk, United States House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923, 930 n.14 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting exercise
of pendent appellate jurisdiction in dicta), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986). But see Dellums v. Powell,
660 F.2d 802, 804 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (suggesting discretionary power of court to append noncollateral
determination to claim of absolute immunity).
58. 737 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985).
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that the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction allowed it to expand the scope
of its interlocutory review beyond the appealable order immediately before it:
[The] defendants raised several additional grounds in the district court
in support of their motion for 12(b)(6) dismissal .... None of these
alternative grounds would in its own right merit interlocutory review
under Cohen. However, under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion, once we have taken jurisdiction over one issue in a case, we may,
in our discretion, consider otherwise nonappealable issues in the case
as well .... We have invoked that discretionary power to consider
issues presenting considerably less overlap than exists here. In view of
that fact, and the waste of judicial resources were this suit to go for-
ward, we see every reason to invoke that power in this case.59
On numerous other occasions, the Second Circuit has invoked the pendent
appellate jurisdiction doctrine to review non-Cohen rulings on an interlocutory
basis.' °  The Fifth,6" Sixth,62  Eighth,63  and Eleventh" Circuits have
similarly appended additional orders to the collateral determinations properly
before them.
59. San Filippo, 737 F.2d at 255 (citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1989) (considering defendants' fair
trial arguments along with collateral order claim alleging violation of statutorily guaranteed privacy rights);
Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir.) (liability determinations of district judge reviewed pendent
to qualified immunity appeal), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); United States v. Persico, 774 F.2d 30,
33 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendant's allegations of violation of Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though reviewable subsequent to final judgment, considered in conjunction with double jeopardy
challenge); United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27,32 n.2 (2d Cir 1983) (claim of prosecutorial vindictive-
ness, acknowledged by court to fall outside of Cohen exception to final judgment rule under Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982), reviewed pendent to double
jeopardy appeal), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Metlin v. Palastra, 729 F.2d 353,355 (5th Cir. 1984) ("We have recently decided to treat
denials of claimed absolute immunity as appealable orders. Our jurisdiction can, in the interest of judicial
economy, extend as a matter of discretion to review of [other issues]." (citation omitted)); In re Nissan
Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 1977) (assessing content of class notice
along with ruling allocating costs and duties of notification).
62. See, e.g., Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1988) (considering, pendent to review of
court officer's absolute immunity defense, whether section 1983 claim was stated against municipal court);
Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 770-71 (6th Cir. 1987) (accepting jurisdiction over interlocutory order
implicating immunity defense, but deciding case on grounds of failure to state claim).
63. See, e.g., Moreno v. Small Business Admin., 877 F.2d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1989) (addressing, in
context of qualified immunity appeal, defendants' claim thatplaintiffstated no Bivens cause of action); Craft
v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412,417-19 (8th Cir. 1987) (considering whether substantial evidence existed to support
plaintiffs' equal protection claim after rejecting defendants' qualified immunity defense); Drake v. Scott,
812 F.2d 395,399-401 (8th Cir.) (determining on qualified immunity appeal whether plaintiffraised genuine
issue of material fact regarding First Amendment allegation or stated due process claim), aff'd on rehearing,
823 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987).
64. See, e.g., Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating
that "[p]endent jurisdiction is properly exercised over nonappealable decisions of the district court when
the reviewing court already has jurisdiction over one issue in the case" in considering school board's
Eleventh Amendment immunity claim pendent to board members' absolute and qualified immunity appeals);
Broughton v. Courtney, 861 F.2d 639, 641 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988) (grounding jurisdiction in defendant's
absolute immunity appeal but resolving case on basis of federal law preemption of state claims).
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III. THE APPROPRIATE CONTOURS OF PENDENT APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A. The Need For Limits
The argument set forth by many of the circuits that exercise pendent
appellate jurisdiction is an attractive one. Once a trial has been interrupted and
their appellate jurisdiction invoked under the collateral order doctrine, they
assert, it makes sense for them to consider other issues in the case if doing so
might speed up the course of the litigation. Consideration of clearly interlocuto-
ry rulings, they point out, can further the goal of judicial economy in one of
two ways. Where addressing the pendent determinations enables an appellate
court to dispose of the litigation entirely, for example by granting a defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "the waste of judicial resources
were th[e] suit to go forward" is thereby avoided. 65 Where a case is destined
to continue on remand, on the other hand, circuit court guidance as to important
issues might "not only minimize the possibility of an expensive and time-
consuming retrial... [but] result in a more expeditious trial [in the first
instance]." '66 Several factors suggest the need, however, to cabin the circum-
stances in which a court can exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction.
1. Jurisdictional Constraints
The collateral order doctrine represents an exception to the well-established
principle that "the existence of appellate jurisdiction in a specific federal court
over a given type of case is dependent upon authority expressly conferred by
statute." 67 Congress' Article H power to create the lower federal courts en-
ables it to organize their operations as it sees fit.68 Its decision, reflected in
section 1291, to delay appellate review of district court orders until after final
judgment has accordingly been shown great deference by the Supreme Court.
The Court has stressed, for example, that the "factual circumstances that
underlie a[n] [interlocutory] claim, however 'extraordinary,' cannot establish
its independent appealability. '69 It has similarly emphasized that whether an
order appears correctly decided has nothing to do with when it may properly
65. San Filippo v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 737 F.2d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1035 (1985); see also Metlin, 729 F.2d at 355 (resting review of dispositive issue on principle
of "judicial economy"); United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1976) (same), rev'd,
435 U.S. 850 (1978).
66. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
67. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957).
68. Finley v. United States, 109 S. CL 2003, 2006 (1989) ("'[T1wo things are necessary to create
jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given the court the capacity to take
it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it .... To the extent that such action is not taken, the power
lies dormant.'") (quoting The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868) (emphasis added by
Finley Court)).
69. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 n.6 (1978).
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be reconsidered. "Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground... [would
create] a license for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress
in § 1291. "17o And it has rebuffed the notion that public policy considerations
can justify premature review. 71 Only where a rigid adherence to section 1291
would act not simply to delay appellate review, but would foreclose such
review altogether on issues of tremendous significance, has the Court invoked
the Cohen rule.
The exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction constitutes, as detailed above,
an extension in the reach of the collateral order doctrine. Determinations are
brought within its ambit that would not, by themselves, comport with its
requirements for expedited review. Given the Court's recognition of the limited
circumstances in which a departure from section 1291 is warranted, it would
seem appropriate for appellate tribunals to append additional interlocutory
decisions to Cohen rulings only when necessary to afford parties the adequate
review of their claims contemplated by the collateral order doctrine.
2. Respect for the District Courts
Because most collateral order appeals are raised in the pretrial stage, it
would appear unlikely that an appellate court could reach out to address factual
determinations as an aspect of its Cohen review even if it desired to do so.
Situations have arisen, however, where courts have exercised pendent appellate
jurisdiction to consider the interim liability rulings of a trial judge in the course
of hearing a Cohen appeal. In Bolden v. Alston,72 for example, several prison
officials who had allegedly denied an inmate his procedural due process rights
appealed an adverse qualified immunity ruling during the middle of their trial.
They phrased their challenge in a manner which implicated the correctness of
one of the district judge's factual determinations, and the circuit court exercised
pendent appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of this determination before
remanding the case for further proceedings.
By acting in such a manner, courts often remove from the hands of a district
judge issues on which she has not rendered her final word. They lose the
benefits of her unique insight into a litigation, insight stemming from her direct
exposure to the salient facts and nuances of a case.73 They further deprive
themselves of the perspective which the full record in a case can provide.74
70. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981).
71. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,470 (1978) ("Respondents ,.. argue that the class
action serves a vital public interest and, therefore, special rules of appellate review are necessary to ensure
that district judges are subject to adequate supervision and control. Such policy arguments... are irrelevant
to the issue we must decide").
72. 810 F.2d 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).
73. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience ofAppellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,781-82 (1957);
Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J 482, 486 (1956).
74. Parkinson v. April Indus., 520 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1975).
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The pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine should thus be defined to preclude
premature circuit court consideration of factual issues, lest the essential role of
the trial judge in our judicial system be undermined.
3. Bootstrapping
A final argument in favor of circumscribing the scope of pendent appellate
jurisdiction focuses on considerations of judicial efficiency which threaten to
outweigh the doctrine's promised gains. A significant reason for narrowly
defining the orders from which an appeal may be taken is to avoid the repeated
disruption of district court proceedings which renders impossible the efficient
conduct of a trial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the cost and delay
inherent in shuttling a case back and forth between tribunals as supporting its
policy against piecemeal review. 5
The circuits exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction do not often implicate
this policy because they utilize the doctrine in a context where an interlocutory
appeal has already been allowed. Were appellate courts to display an unbridled
willingness to hear claims important to litigants as part of their collateral order
review, however, they would provide both an incentive and the means for
parties to circumvent the final judgment rule by bootstrapping issues they desire
to have considered onto claims they otherwise would not raise. The Abney
Court referred to this danger as a principal reason for rejecting collective
appellate dispatch of the related issues in a case. A significant number of
criminal defendants, the Court argued, might find themselves in the position
of being able to "assert[] frivolous double jeopardy claims in order to bring
more serious, but otherwise nonappealable questions to the attention of the
courts of appeals prior to conviction and sentence."76 Government officials,
able almost by definition to raise some sort of immunity defense, similarly
could do just that in order to short-circuit the trial process and receive earlier
appellate consideration of other matters. Clearly, then, the permissible bound-
aries of pendent appellate jurisdiction must not be drawn so broadly as to allow
for the disingenuous initiation of interlocutory appeals.
B. Defining the Parameters
1. Deckert
The Supreme Court's decision in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp."
serves as an instructive starting point in defining the desired limits on pendent
appellate jurisdiction. Deckert did not concern an appeal under the collateral
75. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
76. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977).
77. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
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order doctrine, but instead an appeal from a preliminary injunction which
prevented the defendant from disposing of certain funds claimed by the plain-
tiff. 8 The Court held that the appellate tribunal could properly review, in
conjunction with this order, the denial of the defendant's motions to dismiss
the bill for failure to state a cause of action and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.79 At the same time, the Court declared that the trial judge's rul-
ings allowing for the addition of two plaintiffs and referring an issue of insol-
vency to a master could not be appealed until after final judgment.8 0
Deckert followed a line of older Court cases standing for the proposition
that where an appellate tribunal reviews an interlocutory order implicating
injunctive relief, it is not limited to scrutiny of this order, but may examine the
legal contours of the underlying action to determine" '[i]f insuperable objection
to maintaining the bill clearly appears.""' If such objection, whether jurisdic-
tional or substantive in nature, exists, the court may dismiss the litigation. Thus,
in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing Co.,"2 the Court upheld an
appellate tribunal's termination, on review of a preliminary injunction, of an
action brought for the infringement of a patent, declaring that "if the bill be
obviously devoid of equity upon its face.... we know of no reason why, to
save a protracted litigation, the court may not order the bill to be dismissed." 3
Similarly, in Metropolitan Water Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District,' the
Court approved an appeals court's decision to enter a final decree against the
plaintiff for want of jurisdiction in the course of reviewing the grant of a
temporary injunction. 5 In Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co., 6
on the other hand, the Court declared that a plaintiff's cross-appeal from an
order adjudging several of its patents invalid or not infringed could not be heard
along with the defendant's appeal from an associated order decreeing other
patents infringed and enjoining further violations pending the calculation of
damages. Consideration of the cross-appeal, the Court reasoned, would take the
78. Section 129 of the Judicial Code, the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), authorized interlocutory
review of the injunction. Deckert, 311 U.S. at 286-87.
79. Id. at 287.
80. Id. at 290-91.
81. Id. at 287 (quoting Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 (1920)).
82. 177 U.S. 485 (1900).
83. Id. at 495; see also Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1917) (noting appellate
court's authority to determine, on review of order granting injunction, whether bill stated a claim where
plaintiff sought to restrain defendant union from interfering with existing labor relations); City & County
of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913) (dissolving temporary injunctions and directing
appellate court to dismiss bills against city in suit involving water plant); Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,
165 U.S. 518 (1897) (upholding circuit court's termination, oninterlocutory appeal, of action alleging patent
infringement).
84. 223 U.S. 519 (1912).
85. Id. at 523. The Court agreed that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain a federal suit to enjoin
a local water district from condemning a parcel of land, where proceedings had been instituted by the water
authorities in state court and the requirements of the federal removal statute had not been met.
86. 201 U.S. 156 (1906).
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appellate tribunal far beyond a determination of whether there existed funda-
mental objection to the original bill. 7
2. The Principle of Antecedence
Appellate courts continue to cite to the Deckert line of cases regularly in
examining, pursuant to section 1292(a), the jurisdictional and substantive bases
for suits.88 A number of circuits faced with injunctive orders have built on the
Deckert holding, moreover, in extending the scope of pendent review beyond
consideration of whether a case can be maintained.
The principle informing Deckert and its doctrinal predecessors appears to
be one of antecedence. A circuit court may properly examine, in determining
the appropriateness of injunctive relief, whether an action states a claim,
because where no claim is made out the plaintiff cannot enjoy the reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits typically required for a preliminary injunc-
tion to issue. 9 Similarly, the court can assess whether jurisdiction over a cause
exists, because if jurisdiction is lacking the court possesses no authority to
afford equitable relief. A determination regarding the propriety of injunctive
relief may turn on the issues of jurisdiction or legal sufficiency, that is, and
where it does, those issues can be resolved on the same appeal.
Questions going to the very heart of whether a cause of action can be
maintained are not the only matters of law, however, which a court might find
antecedent to the consideration of an injunctive order. Thus, in Port Authority
Police Benevolent Association v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey,90
the Second Circuit considered an appeal from rulings denying class certification
and a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs. Ordinarily, the court noted, the
disposition of a class action motion is not reviewable prior to final judgment.
In this case, however, the district court's denial of an injunction, clearly
appealable pursuant to section 1292(a), had been premised on a finding that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The district court had based
this finding, in turn, solely on the denial of class status. The appeals court
therefore held it necessary to consider the propriety of class certification prior
to determining whether the plaintiffs should be granted injunctive relief.
Similarly, in Tri-State Generation & Transmission Association v. Shoshone
River Power, Inc.,91 the Tenth Circuit deemed it imperative, in the course of
87. Id. at 162-63.
88. See, e.g., San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 525 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1975)
("Where... there is an appeal otherwise properly before this Court, and the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction is suggested, that issue may be reviewed.") (citing Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518
(1897)).
89. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (detailing traditional standards for
preliminary injunction).
90. 698 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1983).
91. 874 E.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1989).
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a section 1292(a) appeal, to consider the trial judge's grant of partial summary
judgment against the plaintiff, for this ruling had influenced the judge's subse-
quent determination that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff was overly
broad.92
Courts deeming pendent review appropriate where logically requisite to
determining the propriety of equitable relief have strictly assessed the necessity,
however, of considering additional orders in any given case. In Kershner v.
Mazurkiewicz,93 for example, the Third Circuit declined to address a class
certification denial where the district judge had refused to issue an injunction
for reasons unrelated to that determination. A pendent order, the court empha-
sized, "is not appealable under section 1292(a)(1) unless the prelimi-
nary injunction issue cannot properly be decided without reference to [it]." '
Only where orders "bear upon and are central to the grant or denial of [an]
injunction" have such courts reviewed them at the same time.95
3. Application to Collateral Order Review
The principle of antecedence, suggested by the Deckert line of cases and
developed by various circuit courts in considering their scope of review when
faced with interlocutory rulings implicating injunctive relief, should be imported
into the collateral order context. The purpose of Cohen review in ensuring that
rights of serious consequence to litigants are not lost prior to the opportunity
for an appeal in many ways mirrors section 1292(a)'s goal of guarding against
irreparable injury. It would therefore appear appropriate-indeed, essential-for
collateral order courts, like their section 1292(a) counterparts, to consider all
factors material to a determination of whether a collateral order was properly
decided.96
92. Id. at 1351-53; see also Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 808 (5th Cir.) ("Our
established power to review the denial of injunctive relief embraces the power to review the orders that
underpin this denial."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc.,
522 F.2d 1235, 1138 (7th Cir. 1975) ('[]he refusal to certify the suit as a class action limited the potential
injunctive relief which the plaintiff could obtain, and accordingly can be appealed at this time.'), aff'd on
rehearing, 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976).
93. 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 449; see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 209 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stating that "pendent appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise unappealable order is available only to the
extent necessary to ensure meaningful review of an appealable order" in declining to consider class
certification ruling where preliminary injunction had to be vacated regardless of its propriety); Shaffer v.
Globe Protection, Inc., 721 F.2d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that district judge's dismissal of
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 was irrelevant to subsequent denial of preliminary injunction);
Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 709 F.2d 463, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting consideration of trial
judge's refusal to disqualify himself in course of reviewing order denying preliminary injunction).
95. Shaffer, 721 F.2d at 1124.
96. Cf. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[A]ny more limited review
would deprive the appellant of his or her... right to a[n] ... interlocutory appeal.').
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Acting consistent with this logic, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Wright,97 reviewed a decision denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on
prosecutorial misconduct grounds insofar as it bore on the defendant's double
jeopardy appeal. The prosecutorial misconduct ruling did not constitute a
collateral order and as a result was not immediately appealable.98 The court
realized, however, that issues implicated by the ruling were central to the
defendant's double jeopardy claim,99 which rested on the fact that he had
already stood trial on the counts alleged in the indictment; the proceeding had
resulted in the declaration of a mistrial, granted on the defendant's motion, due
to a deadlocked jury."0 Normally, the court noted, a mistrial granted upon
a defendant's request does not bar reprosecution. An exception to this rule
exists, however, where the defendant is forced to move for mistrial due to
prosecutorial overreaching, and the defendant had alleged precisely such
overreaching below. Hence, it was necessary for the appellate court to review
the misconduct issue, though the court stressed that it would do so only "inas-
much as [that issue] relate[d] to the double jeopardy question." 10'
Similarly, in Drake v. Scott,"° the Eighth Circuit deemed it appropriate
to reach, in the context of a qualified immunity appeal, the district court's
refusal to dismiss a due process action against a number of state officials for
failure to state a claim. The defendants contended that the plaintiff's allegations
that they had fired him without due process did not give rise to a cause of
action because the plaintiff enjoyed no property interest in his job. Since the
question of whether the officials had violated clearly established law, which
represents the core of qualified immunity analysis, "depend[ed] in large part
on whether [the] defendants knew or should have known that [the plaintiff] had
a clearly established property interest in [his] job at the time they fired
him,""°3 determination of whether such a property interest existed, and hence
of whether a claim was made out, appeared an essential step in resolving the
collateral order.t" Assessing the applicability of qualified immunity protection
to the defendant's actions rested very much, then, on a consideration of whether
a violation of law could have transpired at all.
Allowing for pendent appellate jurisdiction in the manner exercised by the
Wright or Drake courts does not contravene the demanding requirements the
Supreme Court has established in sanctioning departures from the final judg-
ment rule. Assessing pendent rulings to the extent necessary to assure parties
97. 622 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980).
98. Id. at 794.
99. Id. at 794-95.
100. Id. at 793.
101. Id.
102. 812 F.2d 395 (8th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 823 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965
(1987).




a complete consideration of their collateral order claims appears consistent with
the principle informing the Cohen doctrine that litigants should receive adequate
appellate review of determinations implicating important rights.
At the same time, by limiting the scope of pendent appellate jurisdiction
to those rulings of law crucial to the disposition of a collateral order, the
standard of antecedence guards against inappropriate use of the doctrine. It
eliminates undue appellate intrusion into the district courts' adjudication of
factual issues. It curtails, moreover, the incentive and opportunity for parties
to initiate frivolous Cohen appeals in order to receive appellate consideration
of other claims, for the latter will be reviewed only where, and to the extent,
necessary to resolve the collateral determination.
The application of a standard developed by courts reviewing injunctive
rulings to the collateral order setting is not meant, however, to obscure the
differences between the two contexts. An appellate court enjoys the authority
to address a collateral order not only because a ruling of this sort implicates
an important right, but also because it constitutes a conclusive resolution of an
issue separate from the merits of an action.105 The latter requirement does not
pertain to the review of injunctive orders, where an assessment of the plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits represents an integral aspect of the district
court's ruling on the propriety of equitable relief. 6
That there exists a closer nexus between injunctive determinations and the
central features of a litigation than is true with respect to most Cohen decisions
indicates that fewer claims are likely to be logically antecedent in the collateral
order context. In fact, in many of the cases in which collateral order courts have
exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction, they have done so over rulings in no
way crucial to the disposition of the interlocutory determination properly before
them. In San Filippo v. United States Trust Co. of New York,' °7 for example,
the Second Circuit did not need to assess the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
claims or the evidence presented in support of them in order to determine that
the defendants did not enjoy an absolute immunity from suit regardless of the
nature of their transgressions. Indeed, the San Filippo court had already rejected
the defendants' absolute immunity claim when it turned its attention to the other
issues in the case.108 Nor was it necessary for the Eleventh Circuit, in Stewart
105. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's extension of the Cohen
doctrine to qualified immunity claims indicates a willingness on its part, however, to include rulings the
review of which might involve an assessment of the viability of the plaintiff's cause of action. For while
the Court stated in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985), that a qualified immunity court "need
not ... determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim," that language apparently
referred, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Drake, "to the factual content of the plaintiff's claims," 812 F.2d
at 399, and not to questions regarding the legal sufficiency of the complaint which can be important in
deciding whether it points to the violation of clearly established law and thereby obviates a qualified
immunity defense.
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. 737 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985).
108. Id. at 255.
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v. Baldwin County Board of Education,109 to consider whether the defendant
school board constituted an arm of the state and was therefore entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity in order for it to determine whether the school
board's members were alleged to have violated clearly established law such that
they could not claim a qualified immunity from suit. Justifying their actions
by summary reference to considerations of judicial economy,110 or by refer-
ence to no considerations at all,"' courts exercising pendent appellate juris-
diction in this manner display a troubling lack of concern for the well-estab-
lished limits on their appellate authority. They engage in ever greater departures
from the final judgment rule without devoting adequate attention to the costs
or the necessity of doing so.
CONCLUSION
A debate persists among the federal circuit courts as to the proper scope
of their review under the collateral order doctrine. While a number of circuits
maintain that they may address a wide range of issues once faced with a Cohen
appeal, the jurisdictional nature of the finality requirement, and the role of that
requirement in furthering the effective functioning of the judicial system,
counsel against far-reaching exercises of pendent appellate jurisdiction. Only
where essential to the resolution of properly appealed collateral orders should
courts extend their Cohen jurisdiction to rulings that would not otherwise
qualify for expedited consideration. The purpose of the collateral order doctrine
in ensuring that parties receive a timely review of their important claims does
not warrant the forging of additional inroads into the final judgment rule any
broader than this.
109. 908 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1990).
110. San Filippo, 737 F.2d at 255.
1l1. Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1509.
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